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Luisa Conesa

Abstract
In “The Tropicalization of Proportionality Balancing: the Colombian and
Mexican Examples” the author analyzes how the German based proportionality
balancing test was exported to Latin America, by studying the Colombian
Constitutional Court and the Mexican Supreme Court.
This work is guided by the following questions: what is proportionality
balancing? How has it been used by the Colombian and Mexican jurisprudences
and what are its influences? Do the Courts cite other jurisdictions when using the
test? Have they imported a traditional European test? Or, have they “tropicalized”
it?
The study of the Latin American examples leads to the conclusion that the
Courts have “tropicalized” proportionality balancing. In this context, the term
“tropicalization” is used to describe the fact that the Courts have made the test
their own, adjusting it to their particular jurisprudence by combining elements
from the original German test, the American based differentiated levels of
scrutiny, and elements from their own constitutional standards.
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The Tropicalization of Proportionality Balancing: The Colombian
and Mexican Examples
Introduction
Ever since the Constitutional State replaced the Legislative model –all of
which resulted in the Constitution becoming the norm that occupied the pinnacle
of the legal system–, the question of “how do we interpret it?” has troubled the
minds of scholars and courts alike. The issue is common to European and
American styles of judicial review, because as long as there is an organ that
must determine the meaning of the constitutional text, questions as to how to do
so will arise.1
Even though the problem is similar, the method of approaching it has been
different in both sides of the world. In the field of rights adjudication the American
Supreme Court and the European tradition have developed differentiated
techniques: the former –that normally deals with concrete review– has created an
enormous amount of jurisprudence establishing an assortment of tests with
varying intensities, ranging from rational basis review to strict scrutiny, while the
latter has chosen a different path –particularly in the past twenty years– identified
as proportionality balancing.
The method known as proportionality balancing started essentially with the
German Constitutional Court –although the European Court of Human Rights
also played a part– that set forth in their jurisprudence a new and innovate way to

1

Roughly, it is possible to differentiate European and American traditions in the following
terms: on one hand, European –and Latin American– countries have Constitutional or
Supreme Courts, established by the Constitution itself and fashioned in the model
designed by Hans Kelsen; on the other, the American style is a judicial creation born in
Marbury v Madison.
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deal with rights adjudication that has since become the common language in the
field of constitutional argumentation in many parts of the world.2
Latin America has not been left out of the argumentative loop. Even
though traditionally countries in this region have been influenced by American
trends, this work deals with how proportionality has infiltrated Colombia and
Mexico, aimed at identifying if the countries have imported the traditional
European model, or if they have retained American influence.
The countries chosen provide the opportunity of contrasting a new Court
to an old institution, each with its own argumentative style. Colombia’s Court is
known as possibly the most progressive in Latin America –and one of the most in
the world– despite the fact it is one of the youngest ones in existence –created in
1991–. In opposition, the Mexican Supreme Court is better identified as a more
traditional and mature organization, sitting before the enactment of the 1917
Constitution en force today.3
Our study is guided by the following questions: what is proportionality
balancing? How has it been used by the Colombian and Mexican jurisprudences
and what are its influences? Do the Courts cite other jurisdictions when using the
test? Have they imported a traditional European test? Or have they tropicalized
it?
By tropicalization I mean to ask if the Courts have made the test their own,
adjusting it to their particular jurisprudence and added new or different elements
from the original courts. My thesis is precisely this, that both Courts have

2

Since proportionality balancing is a product of Europe, in general, and Germany, in
particular, I will use the terminology German Test and European Test indistinctively.
3

It is important to mention that even though the Mexican Supreme Court has well before
the 1917 Constitution, the jurisprudence identified as valid is the one issued since 1917,
identified as Quinta Época (Fifth Epoch). Another relevant note is that the Mexican
Judiciary was completely restructured in 1994 though a constitutional amendment, which
effectively transformed the Supreme Court into a Constitutional Court with abstract
review, concrete review, and individual complaints under its jurisdiction –they are known
as acción de inconstitucionalidad, controversia constitucional, and amparo respectively–.
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effectively tropicalized proportionality balancing as they have adapted the test to
their own circumstances by combining European and American elements.4
What is proportionality?
Proportionality balancing came to life as a tool for a new type of
constitutionalism that viewed the founding document not only as a set of rules but
as a richer universe that also contains principles and values, and must be
interpreted accordingly.
The problems that call for its use are not the simple cases in which two
rules compete against each other but rather the hard cases in which principles
and values come into play that –because of their incommensurability– demand a
different approach.
Robert Alexy explains that proportionality and principles are two closely
related concepts:
The nature of principles implies the principle of proportionality and vice
versa. That the nature of principles implies the principle of proportionality
means that the principle of proportionality with its three subprinciples of
suitability, necessity (use of the least intrusive means), and proportionality
on its narrow sense (that is, the balancing requirement) logically follows
form the nature of principles; it can be deduced from them. The Federal
Constitutional Court has stated in rather obscure terms that the principle
of proportionality emerges ‘basically from the nature of constitutional right
themselves’.5

Scholars point out that the use of the word proportionality began in Europe
in the late 1960s. According to Sánchez González it was the German
Constitutional Court that in 1968 recognized the prohibition for excess
(Übermassverbot)

and

the

principle

of

proportionality

(Verhältnis

mässigkeitsprinzip) as rules that were applicable to all State activities deriving
from the rule of law.
In the terminology that was developed, the prohibition for excess and
proportionality in the broad sense were treated as equivalents, while
4

Because the central focus of this work is proportionality and not American tests, the
conceptual framework deals exclusively with the former.
5
ROBERT ALEXY, A THEORY OF CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS. 66 (OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS
2002).
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proportionality in the narrow sense was the balancing requirement (Abwägung).
The latter was introduced in the Luth ruling, where the Court argued that since
the Constitution must be understood as dynamic whole that encompassed an
objective scale of values, the interpreter had to balance them in the context of the
litigation.6
The test is aimed at determining if the State’s intervention on an
individual’s fundamental rights is constitutional, establishing in each case the
hierarchy of the confronting principles.
As applied by the German Constitutional Court, proportionality balancing
involves a three-tier test that will evaluate a State action that an individual has
proved that prima facie constitutes a violation of his rights:
a) Suitability (Geeignetheit): The legislative measure or State action must
be coherent with the legitimate end it was designed to achieve. In other words, if
the mean is suitable to achieve the desired end, it will pass this stage. On the
contrary, if the measure is not related to the end, it will be struck down.
b) Necessity (Erforderlichkeit or Notwendigkeit): The question at this point
is whether the end can be equally well achieved by the use of other means less
burdensome to the individual –i.e. a least restrictive means test–.
c) Proportionality in the strict sense or balancing (Proportionalität or
Abwägung). The final stage of the test is to ask if even though the measure is
narrowly tailored by the first two standards, it fails in terms of proportionality in
the narrow sense because it infringes more on a right that it ought to in
constitutional terms. This final stage is the core of the German test, what Dworkin
would characterize as taking rights seriously.
For Alexy, the third sub-principle expresses the meaning of optimization
relative to competing principles, that is identical with his Law of Balancing that
states: the greater the degree of non satisfaction of, or detriment to, one
principle, the greater must be the importance of satisfying the other.7

6

Santiago Sánchez González, De la Imponderable Ponderación y Otras Artes del
Tribunal Constitucional, TEORÍA Y REALIDAD CONSTITUCIONAL, 12, 2003 at 9, 10.
7
Id. at 401.
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The author further explains that while principles are optimization
requirements relative to what is legally and actually possible,8 the three
subprinciples in question are not principles in that sense but actually rules, as the
question is whether they are satisfied or not, and their non-satisfaction leads to
illegality. He further states that while the principle of proportionality in its narrow
sense follows from the fact that principles are optimization requirements relative
to what is legally possible, those of necessity and suitability follow from what is
factually possible.9
Having laid out the general structure of the German proportionality test,
the next step of this work is to examine how it has been applied in Colombia and
Mexico.
The Colombian Case
Proportionality balancing appeared in Colombian jurisprudence via
violations on the principle of equality, and it has achieved its greatest growth on
this field.
The first time the Court introduced the test was on ruling T-422/92 decided
on June 19, 1992, where it had to rule on a possible violation of the right of
equality in relation to the merits of the appointment of public servants. Instead of
taking a traditional approach to equality, the Corporation specifically cited the
doctrine of the European Court of Human Rights in arguing that not all different
treatments will result in discrimination but only those that are not justifiable under
constitutional terms. The relevant arguments are the following:
Formulas for pointing out when a difference is relevant
12. The principle of equality has the characteristic of being a rule in
modern constitutions, with the inclusion of modern criteria that determines
specifically prohibited categories, that have lead all constitutional
jurisdictions to create formulas aimed at establishing when one is facing
an irrelevant difference, and thus, a discrimination. The most important
are the reasonableness of the difference and the proportionality of the
means incorporated in the means and ends of the norm in question.
8

Values belong in the axiological realm, as opposed to principles that work at
deontological level.
9
See Alexy, supra note 2, at 67.
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Objective and reasonable justification
13. According to the European Court of Human Rights, not every
difference is a discrimination: equality is only violated if the difference
lacks an objective and reasonable justification, and the existence of such
justification must be appreciated in light of the ends and the effects of the
measures considered, with a reasonable relationship of proportionality
between the means used and the ends desired.
Reasonableness of the norm
14. The pairing of the principle of equality with the requirement of
reasonableness in the difference does not solve the problem regarding
which must be the criteria that the judge must choose when evaluating
the work of the legislator. The constitutional judge must not only contrast
his reason with the legislator, even less so when he is judging the
constitutionality of a legal norm. Jurisdiction is a cultural way of producing
the law; the power of the judge derives exclusively from the community
and only the latter’s judicial conscious allows the former to make a
decision on the reasonableness of the legislator’s will.
Proportionality of the norm
15. On the other hand, the means chose by the legislator must not only
be in proportion to the ends sought out by the norm, but must also share
its legitimating. The principle of proportionality seeks not only that the
measure has a legal base, but also that it is applied in such a way that the
legal interests of other people or groups are not affected, or only in a
minimal way. This way, the community is safeguarded against the
excesses or abuses of power that would come from the indiscriminate
use of the legislative power or the discretion granted to the administration.
The burden of argumentation
16. The linking of the principle of equality and the prohibition of State
arbitrary action necessarily supposes a procedural issue regarding who
has the burden of argumentation on the reasonableness of a different
treatment. If the argued inequality comes from a distinction made from the
legislator, and its validity is denied, then the burden of proven the
reasonableness is put upon the organ that defends the law; on the other
hand, the one who questions the law for considering it ignores substantial
differences, must give reasons to support his reasoning.10

Through this argumentation one can identify the beginning of a
proportionality test strictly linked to the principle of equality. The most important
elements of this elementary test are: the objective and reasonable justification,
the reasonableness of the norm, its proportionality, and the burden of
argumentation.
10

Action of tutela number T-298, Jorge Eliecer Rangel Peña v. Recursos Naturales
Renovables y del Ambiente, INDERENA, decided by the 7th Chamber of Revision of the
Constitutional Court, 1992.
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Two years after this judgment came the first appearance of what the
Corporation called a “reasonableness test” in ruling T-230/94 decided on May 14,
1994. The case dealt with unions and the principle of equality and the Court’s
development of the test was as follows:
6. With the purpose of clarifying the justification of the differentiated
treatment, the analysis of the norm can be phenomenologically divided
into several elements. This process is known as the “reasonableness
test”.
C. The “reasonableness test”.
1. The linking between the factual differences and the “pattern of equality”
must be such that the differentiated treatment is justified. To reach this
end international doctrine has pointed out the following defining aspects
of the justification:
1. Difference between the facts.
2. The existence of a normative purpose (end or value) in the different
treatment.
3. Constitutional validity of the proposed purpose.
4. Effectiveness between facts, norm, and end.
5. Proportionality in the relationship of effectiveness.
2. The “test” has the advantage of showing the complexity of the
hermeneutic judgment, separating elements that usually are left
untouched in a general perspective. However, this perspective is a victim
of the contrary defect that one is trying to avoid: the lack of unity. When
considering each one of the 5 step is an autonomous variable, one has
the impression of a purely logical and mechanical analysis that forgets the
real problem of balancing that is at stake, which is no other than the
reasonable interpretation.
2.1. Of the steps provided in the “test”, the first, that refers to the
difference in facts, more than an element of analysis in treatment is a fact
that is proved empirically (inequality in the facts). The next two following
elements can be joined in a single normative study related to the valid
end (reasonableness) ad the justification of the decision that creates a
difference. The effectiveness between the relationship of the normative
means and the end or constitutional value (rationality), as well as its
adjustment (proportionality) can be joined in a single moment, which is
undoubtedly the decisive and most complex point.
The term “proportionality” is one of relationship between objects, or part
of them, quantifiable for reasons of degree, intensity, magnitude, or
another purpose. The idea of adjustment, on the other hand, is broader
and introduces an estimative and circumstantial connotation that is better
for constitutional analysis of values. Yes, when the interpreter analyzes
the whole, composed by the facts, the norm that creates a distinction, and
the pattern of equality, he performs a unique act, very much like the
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circumstances he is judging. His task is not to subsume the facts in the
legal norm and the former, in turn, in the constitutional norm with the
purpose of verifying a logical fitting from the particular to the general. The
constitutional judge is actually called upon to understand –with all the
semantic force of this word– the relationship of the adjustment of the
elements. It is a hermeneutical task in which the elements make up an
organic whole and not just the sum of separable parts.11

It is evident that the Colombian Court took the application of the
“reasonableness test” quite seriously. It devoted a great deal of time in explaining
not just the mechanics of the test but also why it was the best way to deal with
rights adjudication. It is not the case that it simply imports a model from
international doctrine, but rather that it is preoccupied with justifying its new
approach in balancing.
The finalized version of its method of dealing with proportionality and
equality can be found in C-022/96 –a case that dealt with privileges given to
students that had done military services– decided in January 23rd, 1996. In this
occasion the Court devoted more analysis to the element of proportionality –as
applied by the German Constitutional Court– in its own “reasonableness test”. It
argued:
German scholars, studying the jurisprudence of the German
Constitutional Court, have shown how the concept of reasonableness can
be applied satisfactorily only if it is concretized in a more specific one, that
of proportionality. The concept of proportionality is an important tool when
balancing constitutional principles: when two principles collide, because
the application of one implies the reduction of another’s, it is the task of
the constitutional judge to determine if this reduction is proportional in
light of the affected principle’s importance.
The concept of proportionality encompasses three partial concepts: the
fitting of the chosen means in achieving the desired end, the necessity of
using those means to achieve the end (that there is no least restrictive
means that can achieve the end and that is less intrusive to other
constitutional principles) and the proportionality in the strict sense
between means and ends, that is, that the principle that is satisfied by
achieving the end does not sacrifice other more important constitutional
principles.
When it comes to equality, proportionality means that a differentiated
treatment does not infringe on this principle if one can prove that it is 1)
fitting to the achievement of a constitutionally valued end, 2) necessary, in
11

Action of tutela number T-28139, Juan de Jesús Jiménez v. COOP-FEBOR, decided
by the 3rd Chamber of Revision of the Constitutional Court, 1994.
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other words, that there is no other means that is less harmful, in terms of
the sacrifice of the other constitutional principles, to achieve the end, and
3) proportionate, this is, that the differentiated treatment does not sacrifice
values and principles (including equality) that have more weight that the
principle that is to be satisfied by the treatment.12

In its jurisprudence the Colombian Court has developed a “European
inspired” reasonableness test, that links equality to proportionality in the German
sense. But it didn’t stop there. Carlos Bernal Pulido –the author that has devoted
the most time in analyzing the relationship between equality and proportionality in
Colombian jurisprudence– explains that it is possible to distinguish three different
types of tests in Colombian rulings: a European that is based on proportionality
with equal intensity; an American that distinguished different levels of intensity,
and combination of the two:
1. The judgment of equality as a test judgment of proportionality in the
jurisprudence of the Constitutional Court
A first version of the judgment of equality developed by the Constitutional
Court in several rulings, adopts the basic elements of the test of equality
that is applied by the European Court of Human Rights, and the Spanish
and German Constitutional Courts –the former through the “new
formula”–, structured through the principle of proportionality. The Court
has referred to this methodology as “proportionality” and “reasonableness
test”, which regardless of its own terminology, as we stated in other
occasions, cannot be treated as synonyms.
(…)
2. The judgment of equality with three types of scrutiny
According to the Constitutional Court, the second of its lines of
jurisprudence on the principle of equality, “with roots in the jurisprudence
of the Supreme Court of the Unites States” –takes elements from the
most recent American jurisprudence related to the equal protection clause
established in the 14th Amendment– “is based on the existence of
different levels of scrutiny or “tests” of equality (strict, intermediate, or
weak)”. It’s a scale of intensities on the application of the principle of
equality.
(…)
III. The integrated equality judgment
1. The Constitutional Court’s version
In the ruling c-93 of 2001, the Constitutional Court tried to build an
“integrated equality judgment”, that combines the advantages of the
12

Action for unconstitutionality C-022/96, made by Alvaro Montenegro García, decided
by the Colombian Constitutional Court, sitting en banque, 1996.
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European test –structured around proportionality– with those of the
American method. It was about harmonizing the analytical clarity that the
proportionality test offers, with the possibility that each one of its
subprinciples can be applied with a different intensity, according with the
extension of the appreciation that the Legislator or the Administration has
in the relevant subject.13

The Colombian Court has done something unique. It has, on the one
hand, applied the German and the American tests to its own circumstances and,
on the other, has given us an example of tropicalization creating a new doctrine
that combines both and is a fundamental tool in its constitutional analysis.
The study of the 3rd type of Colombian test –which constitutes
tropicalization at its best– will not be done here but rather through the Mexican
example because, as we shall see, the latter adopted the test very recently and
only embraced the integrated judgment of the Colombian jurisprudence, adding
some elements of its own as well.
The Mexican Case
Even though the Mexican Court is older than its Colombian counterpart, its
story when it comes to proportionality is very recent. It was in late 2004 when the
Court began using proportionality balancing, using a “reasonableness test”
–again, mainly in the field of equality– that is based on to the integrated
Colombian test, but has its own particularities when it comes to varying the
degree of intensity.
The Mexican interpretation of the “reasonableness test” was born in its
amparo rulings ADR 988/2004 and AR 1629/2004. The first is a criminal case
and the second a tax, but both deal with equality. They are the first two
precedents that gave way to the jurisprudence titled “EQUALITY. CRITERIA
FOR DETERMINING IF THE LEGISLATOR RESPECTS THIS PRINCIPLE”
which presents the test in the following terms:
Equality in our constitutional text constitutes a complex principle that not
only grants people the guarantee that they will be equal to the law (in their
13

Carlos Bernal Pulido, El Juicio de la Igualdad en la Jurisprudencia de la Corte
Constitucional Colombiana, Universidad Externado de Colombia, 5, 8, 13, available at
http://www.cajpe.org.pe/rij/bases/nodiscriminacion/BERNAL.PDF.
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condition of recipients of norms and users of the judicial system), but also
in the law (in relation to its content). The principle of equality must be
understood as the constitutional requirement to treat equals equally and
unequals unequally, and because of this sometimes making distinctions is
forbidden, while in others it is permitted, or even constitutionally
demanded. When the Supreme Court of Justice decides a case in which
the law distinguishes between two or many facts, situations, individuals or
collectives. To do so, it must determine first if this distinction rests on
objective and reasonable ground: the legislator cannot arbitrarily
introduce differentiated treatments, but it must do so with the aim of
reaching admissible ends within the limits marked by the Constitution, or
clearly included in it. Secondly, it is necessary to examine the rationality
or fitting of the distinction made by the legislator: it is necessary that the
introduction of the difference constitutes an apt mean to achieve the end
or objective, that is, that there is an instrumental relationship between
ends and means. Thirdly, it must comply with the proportionality
requirement: the legislator cannot try to reach legitimate constitutional
objectives in an openly disproportionate manner, and because of this the
judge must determine if the legislative distinction is within the measures
that can be considered as proportionate, taking into account the facts,
objectives, and constitutional goods affected; reaching for a constitutional
objective cannot be done at the expense of an unnecessary or excessive
affectation of other constitutionally protected goods and rights. Lastly, it
is of great importance to determine in each case what is the equality
referent, because equality is both a principle and a right of a
fundamentally adjective nature that is always applied in relation to a
particular situation, and this is relevant in the constitutional control of
laws, because the Constitution allows the legislator in some instances
more freedom to carry about his duty, while on others it requires the
Judge to be specially demanding when determining if the legislator has
complied with the burdens of the principle in question.14

Through the above mentioned jurisprudence the Mexican Supreme Court
established its 3-tier reasonableness test that –when dealing with equality– will
be applied in the following terms:
a) First determine if the end is objective and constitutionally admissible;
b) Second analyze the rationality of the measure, which translates into an
instrumental relationship between means and ends;
c) And third study the proportionality between means and ends,
determining if the quest to achieve a constitutional purpose does not translate
into an unnecessary or excessive transgression of other constitutional values,
14

IGUALDAD. CRITERIOS PARA DETERMINAR SI EL LEGISLADOR RESPETA ESE
PRINCIPIO CONSTITUCIONAL, Primera Sala de la Suprema Corte de Justicia de la
Nación (S.C.J.N.), Semanario Judicial de la Federación y su Gaceta, Novena Época,
tomo XXIV, Septiembre de 2006, Tesis 1a./J. 55/2006, 75 (Mex.).
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verifying if there is a less restrictive measure that the legislator could have
chosen.
After studying the Colombian jurisprudence, one can conclude that this
test is almost identical to their integrated test. It is important to distinguish an
important difference: the Mexican variation stops short of the “proportionality in
the strict sense” component, setting the highest bar in the least restrictive means
test, which leads to striking down far less legislation and state action.
In adding its own touch of tropicalization, the Mexican Court created
another

jurisprudence

titled

“EQUALITY.

CASES

IN

WHICH

THE

CONSTITUTIONAL JUDGE MUST USE STRICT SCRUTINY IN JUDGING
LEGISLATIVE CLASSIFICATIONS (INTERPRETATION OF ARTICLE 1 OF THE
MEXICAN CONSTITUTION)”, aimed at establishing varying degrees of scrutiny,
in line of the Colombian integrated test, but modifying it in light of the
particularities of Article 1 of the Mexican Constitution:
(…) Article 1 of the Federal Constitution establishes several cases in
which strict scrutiny is called for. In its first paragraph, it proclaims that all
individuals must enjoy all the guarantees the text grants, which cannot be
qualified or suspended but in the cases and conditions the text
established, which evidences the constitutional desire to ensure in the
broadest terms the enjoyment of fundamental rights, and that their
limitations are few, according to the exceptional characteristic the
Constitution points out. Because of this, whenever a classification done
by the legislator infringes on fundamental rights, it will be necessary to
apply with strict scrutiny the requirements derived from the principles
equality and non-discrimination. In turn, its third paragraph shows the will
of the legislator to extend the guarantee of equality to fields that are
broader than the constitutional scope, as it prohibits the legislator to incur
in acts of discrimination regarding ethnicity, nationality, gender, age,
disabilities of any kind, social status, health, religion, opinion, preference,
or civil status, or any other that goes against human dignity and has the
object of annulling or transgressing the rights and liberties of the people.
The Constitutional intention is, therefore, to extend the implicit guarantees
in the equality principle to the field of legislative action that have a
significant impact in liberty and human dignity, as well as those that relate
to the series of suspect classification visible in paragraph three, without
implying that the legislator is absolutely forgiven to use said categories,
but only that he must be very careful in doing so. In those cases, the
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constitutional judge must analyze the legislator’s work under strict
scrutiny, through the looking glass of the equality principle.15

The interpretation of Article 1 of the Mexican Constitution allowed the
Court to build a standard for strict scrutiny while applying the reasonableness
test.16 Later, it also developed a standard for a weaker scrutiny –closer to
American rational basis review– in the economic field, through the jurisprudence
titled “CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS. ITS INTENSITY IN LIGHT OF THE
DEMOCRATIC PRINCIPLE AND THE SEPARATION OF POWERS”:
According to the reasons exposed by this Chamber in the jurisprudence
titled ““EQUALITY. CASES IN WHICH THE CONSTITUTIONAL JUDGE
MUST USE STRICT SCRUTINY IN JUDGING LEGISLATIVE
CLASSIFICATIONS (INTERPRETATION OF ARTICLE 1 OF THE
MEXICAN CONSTITUTION)”, whenever the classification done by the
legislator transgresses on fundamental rights, it will be necessary to apply
strict scrutiny in accordance to the requirements of the equality principle
and non-discrimination. In a similar manner, in those cases in which the
constitutional text limits the discretion of Congress or the Executive, the
intervention and control of the constitutional court must be greater, in
order to respect the design established for these purposes. It is clear that
the normative force of the democratic principle and separation of powers
brings the consequence that other State organs –amongst them, the
constitutional judge–, must respect the liberty of configuration bested
upon Congress and the Executive, according to their own powers.
Accordingly, the severity of constitutional control is inversely related with
the degree of liberty of configuration given to the creators of the norm. In
15

IGUALDAD. CASOS EN LOS QUE EL JUEZ CONSTITUCIONAL DEBE HACER UN
ESCRUTINIO
ESTRICTO
DE
LAS
CLASIFICACIONES
LEGISLATIVAS
(INTERPRETACIÓN DEL ARTÍCULO 1o. DE LA CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA DE LOS
ESTADOS UNIDOS MEXICANOS). Pleno de la Suprema Corte de Justicia de la Nación
(S.C.J.N), Semanario Judicial de la Federación y su Gaceta, Novena Época, tomo XX,
Diciembre de 2004, tesis 1a. CXXXIII/2004, 361 (Mex).
16
The text of Article 1 is as follows:
Article 1
In the Mexican United States all individuals shall be entitled to the privileges and
immunities granted by this Constitution. Such privileges and immunities shall not be
restricted or suspended, but in the cases and under the conditions established by this
Constitution itself.
Slavery shall be forbidden in Mexico. Every individual who is considered as a
slave at a foreign country shall be freed and protected under the law by just entering
national territory.
Discrimination based on ethnical or national origin as well as discrimination
based on gender, age, disabilities of any kind, social status, health condition, religious
opinions, preferences of any kind, civil status or on any other reason which attempts
against human dignity and which is directed to either cancel or restrain the individuals’
privileges and immunities, shall be prohibited.
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this way, it is evident that the Constitution requires a modulation of the
reasonableness test, which in no way implies that the Court is renouncing
the exercise of its powers. To the contrary, in the case of the legislation
concerning economic or tax matters, as a general rule, the intensity of
constitutional analysis must not be strict, with the object of respecting the
political liberty of the legislator in fields like the economic, where the
Constitution itself establishes a wide capacity of intervention and
regulation in favor of the State, considering that, when the constitutional
text grants the State a margin of discretion it means that the possibility of
action in favor of the constitutional judge is narrower and, accordingly, the
intensity of control is weakened. In those fields, a very strict control would
lead the constitutional judge to substitute itself in the legislative power –or
the extraordinary capacities given to the Executive–, because it is not the
work of the judiciary, but of the political bodies, to analyze if the economic
classification are the best or if they are necessary.17

Through the abovementioned jurisprudences the Mexican Supreme Court
has built its particular scheme of proportionality, through a mix of the integrated
Colombian test and its own Constitutional mandates.
The finalized version can be explained in the following terms: there are
two opposite sides of constitutional control, strict scrutiny on one hand –which
the Court also refers to as “super motivation”– and weak scrutiny –that the Court
calls “legislative deference” and would best be identified with American rational
basis review– on the other. The reasonableness test will vary in light of the
subject in accordance to those categories.
Defining what level of scrutiny should be applied is part of the
constitutional analysis process, just like the reasonableness test. The steps that
the Mexican Court will take in said process –when it comes to the principle of
equality, which has the most development in Mexican jurisprudence– can be
explained by the subsequent series of questions:
1. Has the plaintiff argued a case based on the principle of equality?
2. Has the plaintiff given the tertium comparationis –a basis for
comparison– and the defendant supported the burden of proof?

17

ANÁLISIS CONSTITUCIONAL. SU INTENSIDAD A LA LUZ DE LOS
PRINCIPIOS DEMOCRÁTICO Y DE DIVISIÓN DE PODERES. Primera Sala de la
Suprema Corte de Justicia de la Nación (S.C.J.N), Semanario Judicial de la Federación y
su Gaceta, tomo XXIV, Noviembre de 2006, Tesis 1a./J. 84/2006, 29 (Mex.).
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3. Is the tertium comparationis within the scope of the principle of
equality?
4. Is the differentiated treatment based on suspect classification? If the
answer is positive, it will lead to strict scrutiny in the reasonableness
test.
5. If it is not a suspect classification, then what is the level of intensity
must be applied? If it is an economic matter, the test will be weaker,
similar to a type of rational basis review. It is also possible to
acknowledge the possibility of an intermediate review based on other
categories.
6. Is the differentiated treatment justified? This is the application of the 3tier reasonableness test.
For example, in the case of a criminal disposition –that inflicts a person’s
fundamental right to liberty– the judge can ask if the road chosen by the legislator
was the most suitable means to achieve the desired end, whereas in the tax
subject the Court must stay one step back, and only ask if there isn’t an
unnecessary violation of other rights, but not striking down legislation because
the legislator didn’t choose another road that that the Court might have
considered better.
In short, the Mexican Court will only apply strict scrutiny –which, as
mentioned, stops at the least restrictive means test and doesn’t go as far as
proportionality in the strict sense– in the extraordinary cases when the
Constitution itself calls for it. Seeing as economic and tax petitions constitute the
majority of work for this Court, striking down a law based on strict scrutiny will be
rare occurrence.
Conclusion: the Tropicalization of Proportionality Balancing
After having reviewed the way the Colombian and Mexican Courts deal
with rights adjucation through their particular versions of proportionality
balancing, one cannot help but conclude that they have tropicalized the

- 15 -

Luisa Conesa
European tests, adding elements from their own constitutional orders and
American jurisprudence to finally create their own standards.
On one hand, the Colombian Court got a head start on the Mexican and
was more explicit in citing comparative law. First, they adopted the German test
with proportionality in the strict sense, and then used the American versions as
far varying degrees of scrutiny, finally creating an integrated test that combined
the two.
On the other hand, the Mexican Court in recent years adopted the
Colombian model –without explicitly saying so– but decided to modify the varying
degrees of scrutiny in relation to its reading of the Mexican Constitution, stopping
at the least restrictive means level. In the end, they created standards for what
American scholars would call rational basis review and strict scrutiny, in
combination with the German test.
In a final word I would like to emphasize the fact that tropicalization is not
a pejorative attribute, but rather the process of explaining how constitutional
control is part of a global community in which doctrines are easily exported and
adapted to best fit the needs of each jurisdiction.
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